In 1995, Kuwakado, Koyama and Tsuruoka presented a new RSAtype scheme based on singular cubic curves y 2 ≡ x 3 + bx 2 (mod N ) where N = pq is an RSA modulus. Then, in 2002, Elkamchouchi, Elshenawy and Shaban introduced an extension of the RSA scheme to the field of Gaussian integers using a modulus N = P Q where P and Q are Gaussian primes such that p = |P | and q = |Q| are ordinary primes. Later, in 2007, Castagnos's proposed a scheme over quadratic fields quotients with an RSA modulus N = pq. In the three schemes, the public exponent e is an integer satisfying the key equation ed − k p 2 − 1 q 2 − 1 = 1. In this paper, we apply the continued fraction method to launch an attack on the three schemes when the private exponent d is sufficiently small. Our attack can be considered as an extension of the famous Wiener attack on RSA.
Introduction
The public key cryptosystem RSA was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [10] in 1978. It is the most popular and widely used public-key cryptosystem. The RSA operations system are based on modular arithmetic. Let p and q be two large primes. The product N = pq is called the RSA modulus and the product φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler Totient function. In RSA, the public exponent e and the private exponent d are integers satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )). A message m is encrypted as c ≡ m e (mod N ) and decrypted using m ≡ c d (mod N ).
Since its introduction in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [10] , the RSA cryptosystem has been generalized in various ways, including extensions to singular elliptic curves and Gaussian integers.
In 1995, Kuwakado, Koyama and Tsuruoka [8] presented a new RSA-type scheme based on singular cubic curves with equation y 2 ≡ x 3 + bx 2 (mod N ) where N = pq is an RSA modulus and b ∈ Z/N Z. The public exponent is an integer e such that gcd (e, (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) = 1 and the decryption exponent is the integer d ≡ e −1 (mod (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)). From this, we deduce that e and d satisfy a key equation of the form ed − k (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1) = 1 where k is a positive integer.
In 2002, Elkamchouchi, Elshenawy and Shaban [5] introduced an extension of RSA to the ring of Gaussian integers. A Gaussian integer is a complex number of the form a + ib where both a and b are integers and i is such that i 2 = −1. The set of all Gaussian integers is denoted Z [i] . A Gaussian prime number is a Gaussian integer that can not be be represented as a product of non-unit Gaussian integers. The only unit Gaussian integers are ±1, ±i. Let P = a + ib and Q = a + ib be two Gaussian primes. Consider the Gaussian integer N = P Q and the Euler totient func-
. Let e be an integer such that d ≡ e −1 (mod φ(N )) exists. Then, in the RSA scheme over the domain of Gaussian integers, a message m ∈ Z[i] is encrypted using c ≡ m e (mod N ) and decrypted using m ≡ c d (mod N ). We note that, in this RSA variant, the key equation is ed − k (|P | − 1) (|Q| − 1) = 1 for N = P Q ∈ Z[i]. In the situation that N = pq is an ordinary RSA modulus, the key equation becomes ed−k (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1) = 1, which is the same than in the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka elliptic curve variant of RSA.
In 2007, Castagnos [3] proposed a probabilistic scheme based on an RSA modulus N = pq and using arithmetic operations in quadratic field quotients. Let e be a integer such that gcd (e, (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) = 1. For any integer r, let V e (r) be the eth term of the Lucas sequence defined by V 0 (r) = 2, V 1 (r) = r and V k+2 = rV k+1 (r) − V k (r) for k ≥ 0. In this scheme, a message m ∈ Z/N Z is encrypted using c ≡ (1 + mN )V e (r) (mod N 2 ) where r is a random integer with 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 2. Then some arithmetic properties, one can decrypt c to get the original message m. Similarly to the KuwakadoKoyama-Tsuruoka elliptic curve variant of RSA and RSA with Gaussian intgers, Castagnos scheme leads to the key equation
The security of the RSA cryptosystem and its variants are based on the difficulty of factoring large integers of the shape N = pq. Nevertheless, in some cases, the modulus N can be factored by algebraic methods that are not based on factoring algorithms. For example, in 1990, Wiener [11] showed how to break RSA when the decryption exponent d satisfies d < The complexity of the encryption and decryption algorithms are based on the size of the encryption key e and the size of decryption key d, respectively. In a cryptosystem with a limited resource such as a credit card, it is desirable to have a smaller value of d. In some scenario, for convenience, e is set to a small constant, such as e = 3.
In this paper, we consider one of the following scenarios where N = pq is the product of two large primes and the public exponent e satisfies an equation ed − k (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1) = 1 with suitably small secret exponent d.
• an instance of the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka cryptosystem [8] ,
• an instance of the RSA over Gaussian integers [5] ,
• an instance of Castagnos scheme [3] .
Our attack works for certain small sizes of d. We show that when d is sufficiently small, namely d <
, then one can find p and q an then factor the modulus N . Our method is based on the continued fraction algorithm as in Wiener's attack. Under the condtion d <
show that one can find
among the covergents of the continued fraction expansion of the public rational number
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the KuwakadoKoyama-Tsuruoka RSA-type scheme, the RSA scheme over Gaussian integers and Castagnos scheme. In Section 3, we review some facts and lemmas used in our attack. In Section 4, we present our new attack with a numerical example. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the two variants of the RSA cryptosystem for which our attack works, namely the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka RSA-type scheme, the RSA scheme over Gaussian integers and Castagnos scheme.
The Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka RSA-type scheme
The Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka RSA-type scheme is based on the use of an RSA modulus N = pq as the modulus of a singular elliptic curve. Let Z N = Z/N Z be the ring of integers modulo N and F p be the finite field. Let a and b be integers with gcd(ab, N ) = 1 and gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2 , N ) = 1. A singular elliptic curve E N (a, b) over the ring Z N is the concatenation of a point O N , called the point at infinity, and the set of points (x, y) ∈ Z 2 N satisfying the Weierstrass equation
If we consider this form modulo p, we get an elliptic curve
with the point at infinity O p . It is well known that the chord-and-tangent method defines an addition law on singular elliptic curves, as for all elliptic curves on F p . The addition law can be summarized as follows.
• For any point P ∈ E p (a, b), P + O p = O p + P = P .
• If P = (x, y) ∈ E p (a, b), then −P = (x, −ax − y).
• If P = (x, y), then 2P = P 3 = (x 3 , y 3 ) with
2ay + ax .
• If P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) with P 1 = ±P 2 , then P 1 + P 2 = P 3 = (x 3 , y 3 ) with
The addition law can be extended to the elliptic curve E N (a, b) in the same way as the addition in E p (a, b) by replacing computations modulo p by computations modulo N . In E N (a, b), a specific problem can occur. Sometimes, the inverse modulo N does not exist. In this case, this could lead to finding a prime factor of N , which is unlikely to happen when p and q are large. Note that this is one of the principles of Elliptic Curve Method of factorization [9] .
In 1995, Kuwakado, Koyama and Tsuruoka [8] proposed a system based on singular elliptic curves modulo an RSA modulus, which can be summarized as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-length.
• Compute N = pq.
• Choose e such that gcd (e, (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) = 1.
•
• Keep p, q, d secret and publish N, e.
Encryption:
• Transform the message as m = (m x , m y ) ∈ Z N × Z N .
• Compute the ciphertext point (c x , c y ) = e(m x , m y ) on the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + bx 2 (mod N ).
3. Decryption:
• Compute the plaintext point (m x , m y ) = d(c x , c y ) on the elliptic curve
Observe the modular inverse d = e −1 (mod (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) can be transformed as a key equation
which will be the starting equation of our new attack.
RSA over the domain of Gaussian Integers
We now focus on how to extend the RSA cryptosystem to the ring of Gaussian integers. We begin by reviewing the main properties of Gaussian integers.
A Gaussian integer is a complex number of the form a + bi where a, b ∈ Z and i is such that i 2 = −1. The set of all Gaussian integers is the ring Z[i]. Let α and β = 0 be two Gaussian integers. We say that β divides α if there exists a Gaussian integer γ such that α = βγ. The norm of a Gaussian integer a + bi is |a + bi| = a 2 + b 2 . A Gaussian prime is a Gaussian integer which is divisible only by a unit. The units in Z[i] are ±1 and ±i and have norm 1. As a consequence, if a 2 + b 2 is a prime number in Z, then a + ib is a Gaussian prime. Conversely, if p ∈ Z is an ordinary prime number, then Gaussian integers p and pi are Gaussian primes if and only if p ≡ 3 (mod 4). The existence of prime factorization in Z[i] allows us to consider Gaussian integers of the form N = P Q where P and Q are Gaussian primes with large norm. Similarly, the existence of Euclidean division and Euclidean algorithm in Z[i] allow us to consider arithmetic operations modulo N . On the other hand, if P is a Gaussian prime, then α |P |−1 ≡ 1 (mod P ) whenever α ≡ 0 (mod P ). Similarly, if N = P Q is the product of two Gaussian primes, then α (|P |−1)(|Q|−1) ≡ 1 (mod N ) whenever α ≡ 0 (mod N ). In particular, if N = pq ∈ Z is the product of two ordinary primes, then α (p 2 −1)(q 2 −1) ≡ 1 (mod N ) whenever α ≡ 0 (mod N ).
Using the arithmetic operations on the ring Z[i], Elkamchouchi, Elshenawy and Shaban [5] proposed an extension of the RSA cryptosystem to Gaussian integers. The scheme can be summarized as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct Gaussian primes P and Q of similar norm.
• Compute N = P Q.
• Choose e such that gcd(e, (|P | − 1)(|Q| − 1)) = 1.
• Determine d = e −1 (mod (|P | − 1)(|Q| − 1))).
• Keep P, Q, d secret, publish N, e.
Encryption:
• Transform the message as a Gaussian integer M ∈ Z[i].
• Compute C ≡ M e (mod N ).
When N = pq ∈ Z where p and q are ordinary prime numbers of the form 4m + 3, the modular inverse of e becomes d = e −1 (mod (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) and can be rewritten as
This is the same key equation that comes up in the Kuwakado-KoyamaTsuruoka RSA-type scheme.
Castagnos scheme
Castagnos scheme [3] was proposed in 2007 and uses an RSA modulus N = pq and a public exponent e such that gcd (e, (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) = 1. The encryption and the decryption algorithms make use of the Lucas series. Let r be an integer. Define V 0 (r) = 2 and V 1 (r) = r. For k ≥ 0, the k + 2th term of the Lucas sequence is defined by V k+2 = rV k+1 (r)−V k (r). The Lucas series can be computed efficiently by the square and multiply algorithm. Castagnos scheme can be summarized as follows, where x p is the Jacobi symbol.
Key Generation:
• Keep p, q secret and publish N, e.
Encryption:
• Transform the message as an integer m ∈ Z/N Z.
• Choose a random integer r ∈ [2, n − 2].
• Compute the ciphertext c ≡ (1 + mN )V e (r) (mod N 2 ).
• Compute r p ≡ V d(p,ip) (mod p) and r q ≡ V d(q,iq) (mod q).
• Compute p ≡ p −1 (mod q) and r = r p + p(r p − r q )p (mod N ).
• Compute t q ≡ c Ve(r) (mod q 2 ) and m q ≡ tq−1 q · p −1 (mod q).
• Compute the plaintext m ≡ m p + p(m q − m p )p (mod N ).
Despite the inverse d ≡ e −1 (mod (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1)) is not used directly in the scheme, we use the key equation ed − k (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1) = 1 to launch an attack on Castagnos scheme when d is suitably small.
Useful Lemmas
In this section, we review the main properties of the continued fractions and state a useful lemma that will be used in the attack.
A continued fraction is an expression of the form a 0 + 1
The continued fraction expansion of a number is formed by subtracting away the integer part of it and inverting the remainder and then repeating this process again and again. As we have seen above, the coefficients a i of the continued fraction of a number x are constructed as follows:
We use the following notation to denote the continued fraction x = [a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ] = a 0 + 1
The following theorem gives us the fundamental recursive formulas to calculate the convergents. Theorem 1. The k th convergent can be determined as
where the sequences {p n } and {q n } are specified as follows 1 :
Theorem 2. Let p, q be positive integers such that p q ∈ N and (p, q) = 1. If
is a convergent of the continued fraction of x.
Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can be found in most of standard textbooks on number theory such as [6] .
Now, we present a useful result that will be used throughout the paper. Lemma 1. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let
Proof. Suppose that q < p < 2q. Then 1 < p q < 2, so since the function
1 The convergents start with p0 q0 , but it is a convention to extend the sequence index to −1 and −2 to allow the recursive formula to hold for n = 0 and n = 1
Multiplying by N , we get
, we get
This terminates the proof.
A New Attack on RSA Variants Based on Continued Fractions
In this section, we propose a new attack on the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka cryptosystem as well as RSA over the Gaussian integer domain and Castagnos scheme in the situation that the key equation ed − k(p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1) = 1 is satisfied with a suitably small secret exponent d.
Theorem 3. Let (N, e) be a public key in the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka cryptosystem or in the RSA cryptosystem with Gaussian integers or in Castagnos scheme with N = pq and q < p < 2q. If e < (p
then one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Let
Using the equation ed − k (p 2 − 1) (q 2 − 1) = 1, we get
and (1), we get
. Now, using Lemma 1, we get
A straightforward calculation shows that
Combining this with (2), we get
, then . Using k and d, we get
Combining with N = pq, we get the values of p and q which leads to the factorization of N . Observe that every step in the proof can be done in polynomial time. This terminates the proof.
Remark 1. Observe that in most of the cases, the public exponent e is fullsized, that is e ≈ N 2 . Then our method of Theorem can be applied to factor
Remark 2. Since e satisfies the key equation
N . In connection with Theorem 3, to ensure d < 
Consequently, our method can not be applied for small values of e such as e = 3.
A numerical example
In connection with Theorem 3, we present an experimental result. We consider the RSA modulus N and the public exponent e as follows. 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 46, 3, 5, 1, 1, 2, 26, 2, 2, 39, 1, 3, 2, 3, 1, 23104, 1, 9,  1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 2 , ....
We can see that the 29th partial quotient is more larger than the previous ones. This means that the 28th convergent is a promising candidate for is satisfied as required in Theorem 3.
Conclusion
We have proposed an attack on three variants of the RSA cryptosystem, namely the Kuwakado-Koyama-Tsuruoka extension for singular elliptic curves, Elkamchouchi et al.'s extension of RSA to the Gaussian integer ring and Castagnos scheme. For the three extensions, we showed that the RSA modulus N = pq can be factored in polynomial time if the public exponent e is related to a suitably small secret exponent d. The attack is based on the theory of continued fractions and can be seen as an extension of Wiener's attack on RSA and Bunder-Tonien's [2] attacks on the RSA.
